In the postindustrial city, relegation takes the form of real or imaginary consignment to distinctive sociospatial formations variously and vaguely referred to as 'inner cities,' 'ghettos,' 'enclaves,' 'nogo areas,' 'problem districts' or simply 'rough neighborhoods'. How are we to characterise and differentiate these spaces; what determines their trajectory (birth, growth, decay and death); whence comes the intense stigma attached to them; and what constellations of class, ethnicity and state do they both materialise and signify? These are the questions I pursued in my book Urban Outcasts (Wacquant, 2008a) through a methodical comparison of the trajectories of the black American ghetto and the European working-class peripheries in the era of neoliberal ascendancy. In this article, I revisit this cross-continental sociology of 'advanced marginality' to tease out its broader lessons for our understanding of the tangled nexus of symbolic, social and physical space in the polarising metropolis at century's threshold in particular, and for bringing the core principles of Bourdieu's sociology to bear on comparative urban studies in general.
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To speak of urban relegation -rather than 'territories of poverty' or 'low-income community,' for instance -is to insist that the proper object of inquiry is not the place itself and its residents but the multilevel structural processes whereby persons are selected, thrust and maintained in marginal locations, as well as the social webs and cultural forms they subsequently develop therein. Relegation is a collective activity, not an individual state; a relation (of economic, social and symbolic power) between collectives, not a gradational attribute of persons. It reminds us that, to avoid falling into the false realism of the ordinary and scholarly common sense of the moment, the sociology of marginality must fasten not on vulnerable 'groups' (which often exist merely on paper, if that) but on the institutional mechanisms that produce, reproduce and transform the network of positions to which its supposed members are dispatched and attached. And it urges us to remain agnostic as to the particular social and spatial configuration assumed by the resulting district of dispossession. In particular, we cannot presume that the emerging social entity is a 'community' (implying at minimum a shared surround and identity, horizontal social bonds and common interests), even a community of fate, given the diversity of social trajectories that lead into and out of such areas. 2 We also should not presuppose that income level or material deprivation is the preeminent principle of vision and division, as persons with low income in any society are remarkably heterogenous (artists and the elderly, service workers and graduate students, the native homeless and paperless migrants, etc.) and form at best a statistical category.
Urban Outcasts is the summation of a decade of theoretical and empirical research tracking the causes, forms and consequences of urban 'polarisation from below' in the United States and Western Europe after the close of the Fordist-Keynesian era, leading to a diagnosis of the predicament of the postindustrial precariat coalescing in the neighbourhoods of relegation of advanced society. The book brings the core tenets of Bourdieu's sociology to bear on a wide array of field, survey and historical data on inner Chicago and outer Paris to contrast the sudden implosion of the black American ghetto after the riots of the 1960s with the slow decomposition of the working-class districts of the French urban periphery in the age of deindustrialisation. It puts forth three main theses and sketches an analytic framework for renewing the comparative study of urban marginality that I spotlight to help us elucidate the relations of poverty, territory and power in the postindustrial city.
From ghetto to hyperghetto, or the political roots of black marginality
The study opens by parsing the reconfiguration of race, class and space in the American metropolis because the foreboding figure of the dark ghetto has become epicentral to the social and scientific imaginary of urban transformation at century's turn.
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On American shores, the abrupt and unforeseen involution of the 'inner city' -a geographic euphemism obfuscating the reality of the ghetto as instrument of ethnoracial entrapment imposed uniquely upon blacks -was the target of a fresh plank of policy worry and scholarly controversy. Across Western Europe, vague images of 'the ghetto' as a pathological space of segregation, dereliction and deviance imported from America (with rekindled intensity after the Los Angeles riots of Spring 1992) suffused as well as obscured journalistic, political and intellectual debates on immigration and inequality in the dualising city.
The first thesis, accordingly, charts the historic transition from ghetto to hyperghetto in the United States and stresses the pivotal role of state structure and policy in the (re)production of racialised marginality. Revoking the trope of 'disorganisation' inherited from the Chicago school of the 1930s and rejecting the tale of the 'underclass' (in its structural, behavioral and neoecological variants) which had come to dominate research on race and poverty by the 1980s, Urban Outcasts shows that the black American ghetto collapsed after the peaking of the civil rights movement to spawn a novel organisational constellation: the hyperghetto. To be more precise, the 'Black Metropolis,' lodged at the heart of the white city but cloistered from it, which both ensnared and enjoined AfricanAmerican urbanites in a reserved perimeter and a web of shared institutions built by and for blacks between 1915 and 1965, 4 collapsed to give way to a dual sociospatial formation.
This decentered formation, stretching across the city, is composed of the hyperghetto proper (HyGh), that is, the vestiges of the historic ghetto now encasing the precarised fractions of the black working class in a barren territory of dread and dissolution devoid of economic function and doubly segregated by race and class, on the one hand, and of the burgeoning black middleclass districts (BMCD) that grew mostly via public employment in satellite areas left vacant by the mass exodus of whites to the suburbs, on the other. Whereas space unified African Americans into a compact if stratified community from World War I to the revolts of the 1960s, now it fractures them along class lines patrolled by state agencies of social control increasingly staffed by middle-class blacks charged with overseeing their unruly lower-class brethen. 5 The encapsulating dualism of the Fordist half-century inscribed in symbolic, social and physical space, summed up by the equation White:Black :: City:Ghetto has thus been superseded by a more complex and tension-ridden structure White:Black :: City::BMCD:HyGh following a fractal logic according to which the residents of the hyperghetto find themselves doubly dominated and marginalised.
Breaking with the stateless cast of mainstream US sociology of race and poverty, Urban Outcasts then finds that hyperghettoisation is economically underdetermined and politically overdetermined. The most distinctive cause of the extraordinary social intensity and spatial concentration of black dispossession in the hyperghetto is not the 'disappearance of work' (as argued by William Julius Wilson (1996) ) or the stubborn persistence of 'hypersegregation' (as proposed by Douglas Massey (Massey and Denton, 1993) ), although these two forces are evidently at play. It is government policies of urban abandonment pursued across the gamut of employment, welfare, education, housing and health at multiple scalesfederal, state and local -and the correlative breakdown of public institutions in the urban core that have accompanied the downfall of the communal ghetto. This means that the conundrum of class and race (as denegated ethnicity) in the American metropolis cannot be resolved without bringing into our analytic purview the shape and operation of the state, construed as a stratification and classification agency that decisively shapes the life options and strategies of the urban poor.
The 'convergence thesis' specified and refuted
The second part -and central thesis -of Urban Outcasts takes the reader across the Atlantic to disentangle the same spatial nexus of class, ethnicity and state in postindustrial Europe. Puncturing the panic discourse of 'ghettoisation' that has swept across the continent over the past two decades, crashing Nordic countries head on in the 2000s, 6 it demonstrates that zones of urban deprivation in France and neighbouring countries are not ghettos a`l'ame´ricaine. Despite surface similarities in social morphology (population makeup, age mix, family composition, relative unemployment and poverty levels) and representations (the sense of indignity, confinement and blemish felt by their residents) due to their common position at the bottom of the material and symbolic hierarchy of places that make up the metropolis, the remnants of the black American ghetto and European workingclass peripheries are separated by enduring differences of structure, function and scale as well as by the divergent political treatments they receive.
To sum them up: repulsion into the black ghetto is determined by ethnicity (E), inflected by class (C) with the emergence of the hyperghetto in the 1970s and intensified by the state (S) throughout the century, according to the summary algebraic formula [(E . C) x S]. By contrast, relegation in the urban periphery of Western Europe is driven by class position, inflected by ethnonational membership and mitigated by state structures and policies, as summed up by the formula [(C . E) O S]. It is not spawning 'immigrant cities within the city,' endowed with their own extended division of labour and duplicative institutions, based on ethnic compulsion applied uniformly across class levels. It is not, in other words, converging with the black American ghetto of mid-20th century characterised by its joint function of social ostracisation and economic exploitation of a dishonored population.
To lump variegated spaces of dispossession in the city under the label of 'ghetto' bespeaks, and in turn perpetuates, three mistakes that the book dispels. The first consists in invoking the term as a mere rhetorical device intended to shock public conscience by activating the lay imaginary of urban badlands.
7 But a ghetto is not a 'bad neighborhood,' a zone of social disintegration defined (singly or in combination) by segregation, deprivation, dilapidated housing, failing institutions and the prevalence of vice and violence. It is a spatial implement of ethnoracial closure and control resulting from the reciprocal assignation of a stigmatised category to a reserved territory that paradoxically offers the tainted population a structural harbour fostering selforganisation and collective protection against brute domination.
8 The second mistake consists in conflating the communal ghetto with the hyperghetto: impoverishment, economic informalisation, institutional desertification and the depacification of everyday life are not features of the ghetto but, on the contrary, symptoms of its disrepair and dismemberment.
The third error misreads the evolution of traditional working-class territories in the European city. In their phase of postindustrial decline, these defamed districts have grown more heterogenous ethnically while postcolonial migrants have become more dispersed (even as nodes of high density have emerged to fixate media attention and political worry); 9 their organisational ecology has become more sparse, not more dense; their boundaries are porous and routinely crossed by residents who climb up the class structure; and they have failed to generate a collective identity for their inhabitants -notwithstanding the fantastical fear, coursing through Europe, that Islam would supply a shared language to unify urban outcasts of foreign origins and fuel a process of 'inverted assimilation' (Liogier, 2012) . In each of these five dimensions, neighbourhoods of relegation in the European metropolis are consistently moving away from the pattern of the ghetto as device for sociospatial enclosure: they are, if one insists on retaining that spatial idiom, anti-ghettos.
To assert that lower-class districts harbouring high densities of bleak public housing, vulnerable households and postcolonial migrants are not ghettos is not to deny the role of ethnic identity -or assignation -in the patterning of inequality in contemporary Europe. Urban Outcasts is forthright in stressing the 'banalization of venomous expressions of xenophobic enmity' and the 'cruel reality of durable exclusion from and abiding discrimination on the labor market' based on national origins; it fully acknowledges that 'ethnicity has become more a more salient marker in French social life ' (pp. 195-196) as in much of the continent. But cognitive salience is not social causation. The sharp appreciation of the ethnic currency in the political and journalistic fields does not mean that its weight has grown pari passu as a determinant of position and trajectory in the social and urban structure, nor that it now routinely skews ordinary interactions and everyday experience. 10 Moreover, ethnic rifts, when they do surge and stamp social relations, do not assume everywhere the same material form.
To maintain that ghettoisation is not at work in the pauperised and stigmatised districts of the European city is simply to recognise that the modalities of ethnoracial classification and stratification, including their inscription in space, differ on the two sides of the Atlantic, in keeping with longstanding differences in state, citizenship and urbanism between Western Europe and the United States. In the urban periphery of the Old World, resurging or emerging divisions based on symbolic markers activated by migration do not produce 'ethnic communities' in the Weberian sense of segmented collectivies, ecologically separate and culturally unified, liable to act as such on the political stage, 11 as the inflexible hypodescent-based cleavage called race has for African Americans -and only for them in the sweep of history in the country. Ethnicity is defined by shifting and woolly criteria that operate inconsistently across institutional domains and levels of the class structure, such that it does not produce a coordinated alignment of boundaries in symbolic, social and physical space liable to foster a dynamic of ghettoisation. 
The 'emergence thesis' formulated and validated
Refuting the thesis of transatlantic convergence on the pattern of the black American ghetto leads to articulating the thesis of the emergence of a new regime of urban marginality, distinct from that which prevailed during the century of industrial growth and consolidation running roughly from 1880 to 1980. The third part of Urban Outcasts develops an ideal-typical characterisation of this ascending form of 'advanced marginality' -thus called because it is not residual, cyclical or transitional, but rooted in the deep structure of financialised capitalism -that has supplanted both the dark ghetto in the United States and traditional workers' territories in Western Europe. 13 A cross-sectional cut reveals six synchronic features (Chapter 8) while a longitudinal perspective ferrets out four propitiating dynamics (Chapter 9), including the polarisation of the occupational structure and the reengineering of the state to foster commodification. Here I want to spotlight two of those features, the one material and the other symbolic, to emphasise the novelty of advanced marginality.
The paramount material attribute of the emerging regime of marginality in the city is that it is fed by the fragmentation of wage labor, that is, the diffusion of unstable, parttime, short-term, low-pay and dead-end employment at the bottom of the occupational structure -a master trend that has accelerated and solidified across advanced nations over the past two decades (Cingolani, 2011; Kalleberg, 2011; Pelizzari, 2009 . Whereas the life course and household strategies of the working class for much of the 20th century were anchored in steady industrial employment set by the formula 40-50-60 (40 hours a week for 50 weeks of the year until age 60, in rough international averages), today the unskilled fractions of the deregulated service proletariat face a simultaneous dearth of jobs and plethora of work tenures that splinter and destabilise them. Their temporal horizon is shortened as their social horizon is occluded by the twin obstacles of endemic unemployment and rampant precarity, translating into the conjoint festering of hardship and proliferation of the 'working poor.' 14 This double economic penalty is particularly prevalent in lower-class neighborhoods gutted out by deindustrialisation. One illustration: in France between 1992 and 2007, the number of wage earners in insecure jobs (short-term contracts, temporary slots, government-sponsored posts and traineeships) increased from 1.7 million to 2.8 million to reach 12.4% of the active workforce against the backdrop of a national unemployment rate oscillating between 7 and 10 percent; for those aged 15 to 24 that proportion jumped from 17% to 49% (Maurin and Savidan, 2008) . But, in the 571 officially designated 'sensitive urban zones' (ZUS) targeted by France's urban policy, the combined share of unemployed and precariously employed youths zoomed from 40% in 1990 to above 60% after 2000.
Far from protecting from poverty as it expands, fragmented wage labour is a vector of objective social insecurity among the postindustrial proletariat as well as subjective social insecurity among the inferior strata of the middle class -whose members fear social downfall and being unable to transmit their status to their children due to intensified school competition and the loosening of the links between credentials, employment and income. On this count, Urban Outcasts is an invitation to relink class structure and urban structure from the ground up and a warning that an exclusive focus on the spatial dimension of poverty (as fostered, for instance, by studies of 'neighbourhood effects') 15 partakes of the obfuscation of the new social question of the early 21st century: namely, the spread and normalisation of social insecurity at the bottom of the class ladder and its ramifying impact on the life strategies and territories of the urban precariat.
But the inexorable propagation of 'McJobs' -petits boulots in France, Billig-Jobs in Germany, zero-hour contracts in the United Kingdom, lavoretti in Italy, biscate in Portugal, etc. -is not the only force impinging on the precariat. A second, properly symbolic vector acts to entrench the social instability and redouble the cultural liminality of its constituents: territorial stigmatisation. Mating Bourdieu's (1990) theory of symbolic power with Goffman's (1964) analysis of the management of spoiled identities, I forged this notion to capture how the blemish of place affixed on zones of urban decline at century's turn affects the sense of self and the conduct of their residents, the actions of private concerns and public bureaucracies and the policies of the state toward dispossessed populations and districts in advanced society.
First, I document that territorial taint is indeed a distinctive, novel and generalised phenomenon, correlative of the dissolution of the black American ghetto and of the European working-class periphery of the Fordist-Keynesian period, that has become superimposed on the stigmata traditionally associated with poverty, lowly ethnic origins and visible deviance. Since the publication of the book, proliferating studies have documented the rise, tenacity and ramifying reverberations of spatial stigma in cities spread across three continents. 16 Next, I show that the denigration of place wields causal effects in the dynamics of marginality via cognitive mechanisms operating at multiple levels. Inside districts of relegation, it incites residents to engage in coping strategies of mutual distancing, lateral denigration, retreat into the private sphere and neighbourhood flight that converge to foster diffidence and disidentification, distend local social ties and thus curtail their capacity for proximate social control and collective action. Around them, spatial disgrace warps the perception and behaviour of operators in the civic arena and the economy (as when firms discriminate based on location for investment and address of residence for hiring), 17 as well as the delivery of core public services such as welfare, health and policing (law-enforcement officers feel warranted to treat inhabitants of lowly districts in a discourteous and brutal manner). In the higher reaches of social space, territorial stigma colours the output of specialists in cultural production such as journalists and academics; and it contaminates the views of state elites, and through them the gamut of public policies that determine marginality upstream and distribute its burdens downstream. To label a depressed cluster of public housing a 'cite´-ghetto', a 'sink estate' or a 'ghettoomra˚de', fated by its very makeup to devolve into an urban purgatory, closes off alternative diagnoses and facilitates the implementation of policies of removal, dispersal or punitive containment.
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Lastly, I propose that territorial stigmatisation actively contributes to class dissolution in the lower regions of social and physical space. The sulfurous representations that surround and suffuse declining districts of dispossession in the dual metropolis reinforce the objective fragmentation of the postindustrial proletariat stemming from the combined press of employment precarity, the shift from categorical welfare to contractual workfare and the universalisation of secondary schooling as a path to access even unskilled jobs. Spatial stigma robs residents of the ability to claim a place and fashion an idiom of their own; it saddles them with a noxious identity, imposed from the outside, which adds to their symbolic pulverisation and electoral devalorisation in a political field recentered around the educated middle class. So much to say that the precariat is not a 'new dangerous class,' as proposed by Guy Standing (2011) , but a miscarried collective that can never come into its own precisely because it is deprived not just of the means of stable living but also of the means of producing its own representation. Lacking a shared language and social compass, riven by fissiparity, its members do not flock to support far-rightist parties so much as disperse and drop out of the voting game altogether as from other forms of civic participation.
A Bourdieusian framework for the comparative sociology of urban inequality
Urban Outcasts sketches a historical model of the ascending regime of poverty in the city at century's turn. It forges notionsghetto, hyperghetto, anti-ghetto, territorial stigmatisation, advanced marginality, precariat -geared to developing a comparative sociology of relegation capable of eschewing the uncontrolled projection across borders of the singular experience of a single national society tacitly elevated to the rank of analytic benchmark. It does so by applying to urban questions five principles undergirding Pierre Bourdieu's approach to the construction of the sociological object.
These principles are worth spotlighting by way of closing since this is a facet of the book that has been overlooked even by its more sympathetic critics. 19 The first principle derives directly from 'historical epistemology', the philosophy of science developed by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, and adapted by Bourdieu for social inquiry: clearly demarcate folk from analytic notions, retrace the travails of existing concepts in order to cast your own, and engage the latter in the endless task of rational rectification through empirical confrontation (Bourdieu et al., 1991 (Bourdieu et al., [1968 ; Broady, 1991) . Such is the impulse behind the elaboration of an institutionalist conception of the ghetto as Januslike contraption for ethnoracial enclosure, commenced in this book and completed in its sequel, The Two Faces of the Ghetto, which further differentiates the ghetto from the ethnic cluster and the derelict district; compares it with its functional analogues of the reservation, the camp and the prison; and stresses the paradoxical profits of ghettoisation as a modality of structural integration for the subordinate population (Wacquant, 2016) . Second comes the relational or topological mode of reasoning, deployed here to disentangle the mutual connections and conversions between symbolic space (the grid of mental categories that orient agents in their cognitive and conative construction of the world), social space (the distribution of socially effective resources or capitals) and physical space (the built environment resulting from rival efforts to appropriate material and ideal goods in and through space).
The third principle expresses Bourdieu's radically historicist and agonistic vision of action, structure and knowledge: capture urban forms as the products, terrains and stakes of struggles waged over multiple temporalities, ranging from the longue dure´e of secular constellations to the mid-level tempos of policy cycles to the short-term phenomenological horizon of persons at ground level. In this perspective, America's Black Belt and France's Red Belt, like districts of relegation in other societies, emerge as historical animals with a birth, maturity and death determined by the balance of forces vying over the meshing of class, honour and space in the city. Similarly, the hyperghetto of the US metropolis and the anti-ghettos of Western Europe are not eternal entities springing from some systemic logic but time-stamped configurations whose conditions of genesis, development and eventual decay are sustained or undermined by distinct configurations of state and citizenship. The fourth tenet recommends the use of ethnography as an instrument of rupture and theoretical construction, rather than a simple means for producing an experience-near picture of ordinary cultural categories and social relations. It implies a fusion of theory and method in empirical research that overturns the conventional division of intellectual labour in urban inquiry marked by the routine divorce of microscopic observation and macroscopic conceptualisation.
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Last but not least, we must heed the constitutive power of symbolic structures and track their double effects, on the objective webs of positions that make up institutions, on the one side, and on the incarnate systems of dispositions that compose the habitus of agents, on the other. As illustrated by territorial stigmatisation, this principle is especially apposite for the analysis of the fate of deprived and disparaged populations, such as today's urban precariat, that have no control over their representation and whose very being is therefore moulded by the categorisation -in the literal sense of public accusation -of outsiders, chief among them professionals in authoritative discourse such as politicians, journalists and social scientists. So much to say that the sociologist of marginality must punctiliously abide by the imperative of epistemic reflexivity and exert constant vigilance over the myriad operations whereby she produces her object, lest she gets drawn into the classification struggles over districts of urban perdition that she has for mission to objectivise.
These five principles propel the comparative dissection of the triadic nexus of class (trans)formation, graduations of honor and state policy in the nether regions of metropolitan space across the Atlantic presented in this book. They can also fruitfully guide a triple extension of the sociology of urban relegation in the era of social insecurity across continents, theoretical borders and institutions. Geographically, they can steer the adaptation of the schema of advanced marginality via sociohistorical transposition and conceptual amendment to encompass other countries of the capitalist core as well as rising nations of the Second World where disparities in the metropolis are both booming and shape-shifting rapidly.
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Theoretically, taking Bourdieu's distinctive concepts and propositions into city trenches offers a formidable springboard to both challenge and energise urban sociology in globo. 22 It does not just add a new set of powerful and flexible notions (habitus, field, capital, doxa, symbolic power) to the panoply of established perspectives: it points to the possibility of reconceptualising the urban as the domain of accumulation, differentiation and contestation of manifold forms of capital, which effectively makes the city a central ground and prize of historical struggles.
On the institutional front, the consolidation of a new regime of urban marginality begs for a focused analysis of the policy moves whereby governments purport to curb, contain or reduce the very poverty that they have paradoxically spawned through economic 'deregulation' (as re-regulation in favour of firms), welfare retraction and revamping and urban retrenchment. It calls, in other words, for linking changing forms of urban marginality with emerging modalities of state-crafting. This is done in my book Punishing the Poor, which enrolls Bourdieu's concept of bureaucratic field to diagram the invention of a punitive mode of regulation of poverty knitting restrictive 'workfare' and expansive 'prisonfare' into a single organisational and cultural mesh flung over the problem territories and categories of the dualising metropolis (Wacquant, 2009b and see also Wacquant 2009c for an analysis of the international diffusion of the penalization of poverty as a core component of neoliberal policy transfer). The wards of urban dereliction wherein the precarised and stigmatised fractions of the postindustrial working class concentrate turn out to be the prime targets and testing ground upon which the neoliberal Leviathan is being manufactured and run in. Their study is therefore of pressing interest, not just to scholars of the metropolis, but also to theorists of state power and to citizens mobilised to advance social justice in the 21st century city. 
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